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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I present an argument in favour of a parental duty to use preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD). I argue that if embryos created in vitro were able to decide for 
themselves in a rational manner, they would sometimes choose PGD as a method of 
selection. Couples, therefore, should respect their hypothetical choices on a principle similar 
to that of patient autonomy. My thesis shows that no matter which moral doctrine couples 
subscribe to, they ought to conduct the PGD procedure in the situations when it is impossible 
to implant all of the created embryos and if there is a significant risk for giving birth to a child 
with a serious condition.1 
 
The article presents an argument supporting the claim that preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) would be chosen as the method of selection by rational agents under some 
circumstances. The argumentation suggests that performing PGD is demanded from the 
perspective of embryos in the situations when not all of the created embryos can be 
implanted and there is a significant risk of passing on a serious condition. Therefore it is 
obligatory for couples because of a principle similar to the one concerning respect for 
patient autonomy. The argument can be accepted by advocates of various moral doctrines 
as it does not refer to any of them, but it is based on criteria of rational decisions in 
situations of risk or uncertainty and the principle of respect for patient autonomy. It also has 
an important advantage over standard arguments in support of PGD: it circumvents the non-
                                                          
1 An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 27th European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine 
and Health Care in Basel. 
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identity problem, because it does not refer to benefits and harms for future people, but to 
hypothetical preferences of the interested parties.  
The paper operates on the assumption—which does not seem to be controversial—
that the decision about the choice of selection method is made in a society in which the in 
vitro fertilisation (IVF) procedure, and the production of so called ‘surplus embryos’, is 
allowed by law and practically performed. This assumption is not controversial because the 
procedure is permissible in all the European Union countries, including those where other 
issues related to the protection of the embryo and fetus are regulated in quite a restrictive 
manner (such as Ireland and Poland). It means that many couples who decide to have IVF are 
confronted with a dilemma: either they can let the clinician choose the best embryos for 
implantation by using some criteria such as PGD or they can choose randomly. 
I will begin the paper with a hypothetical example which will be the basis of my 
further investigations (for the first time I have presented it in discussions of the Polish 
Bioethical Society 1 2) and then I will explain why it poses a dilemma similar to the decision 
problem during the IVF procedure. I will clarify some philosophical issues related to my 
interpretation of the example, in particular my use of the principle of patient autonomy and 
my understanding of the requirements of rationality. Then I will discuss possible objections 
to the argumentation and finally I will analyse whether we should genetically test for 
correlates of well-being. 
 
AN EXAMPLE 
Let us imagine that Anne and John, middle-aged siblings who undoubtedly enjoy full moral 
status according to every normative moral doctrine, have found themselves in an 
unfortunate situation which was not caused by either of them. They were kidnapped by a 
group of terrorists who are going to kill one of them soon. The terrorists are serious: their 
group is world famous for the regular kidnapping of pairs of tourists and then killing one of 
them and releasing the other. One of the kidnapped people has an as-yet undiagnosed 
genetic condition that can be easily tested for and will surely die within a year (or some 
other as-yet undiagnosed disease or impairment responsible for an early death). The other is 
perfectly healthy and one can reasonably expect that this person will live for 40 years more. 
The problem is that nobody knows which of them is healthy and which is ill. Luckily for them, 
it is possible to take a test which will unequivocally indicate the sick person. 
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The terrorists are so vicious that they want the kidnapped themselves to decide in 
advance on the method of selection of the person to be killed: either they decide that the 
terrorists will kill the one who turns out to be sick after taking the test or they can rely on 
pure luck (if they do not make any decision themselves, the terrorists will decide randomly). 
In a hypothetical situation of choice presented in this example, we should assume that each 
rational agent would choose the test. On one hand, nobody suffers from the test: no matter 
if you flip a coin or take a test, the probability of surviving is identical, equalling 0.5. On the 
other hand, if we assume that every rational agent wants to stay alive for a long time (in the 
frames of the present human scale and all other things being equal) and in the situation of 
risk he maximizes expected value, he should prefer to take the test. Let us assume that each 
year of life is a certain unit of measure. In cases when the choice was made by relying on 
pure luck, the expected value expressed in the years left to live amounts to 10.25 
{0.5×[(40×0.5)+(1×0.5)]}; in the case when the choice was made on the basis of the test, it is 
20 {0.5×40}. It is thus because in the first case there is a 0.5 chance of being chosen and then 
a 0.5 probability that the chosen person is healthy and 0.5 that he or she is ill (therefore we 
have to add expected values that someone will live for the next 40 years and that someone 
will live for only 1 year). In the second case we know that the person chosen on the basis of 
the test will live for the next 40 years and the probability of being healthy (that means being 
chosen) is 0.5.  
This hypothetical example is analogical to a situation when there are two in vitro 
fertilised embryos and only one of them can be implanted: the kidnapped siblings are the 
embryos, the terrorists are the couple. The case is meant to represent many situations when 
embryos have conditions or impairments that are responsible for their premature death or 
inability to implant, for example, when one of the embryos’ parents is a carrier of a disease 
that is inherited in an autosomal dominant manner. It means that the actual threat of an 
illness in such a case, in which there is a 0.5 probability of inheriting the illness for both 
embryos, is slightly different from the one described above, as the two randomly chosen 
embryos can be healthy or ill. However, this difference does not add anything significant to 
my argumentation: one can assume that in a situation when the siblings are simultaneously 
healthy or sick, the decision about staying alive is made randomly and such cases are 
omitted in this paper. To put it simply, I also assume—which is perhaps not far from the 
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truth—that all of the human embryos remaining after in vitro fertilisation will be destroyed, 
sooner or later. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM PATIENT AUTONOMY 
This hypothetical example shows that in a particular situation of choice, when physicians are 
able to implant only some of the embryos, the decision to carry out PGD would be rationally 
preferred, by some observers and external decision-makers (because of reducing the costs 
of medical care, parental preferences, etc), and by the embryos themselves. So, couples 
should accept PGD as the desired method of selection out of a sense of respect for the 
hypothetical choices that would be made by their offspring.  
Such an interpretation refers to the concept of autonomy: it is assumed that medical 
decisions should be made when respecting the autonomy of a patient, that is, making them 
a part of the decision making process related to them as well as allowing them to voice 
objections against the diagnosis, and healing and preventative treatments offered to them. 
The decisions are autonomous, when they are intentional, made with understanding and 
without any controlling influences, which is of course impossible when it comes to the case 
of embryos. If it is impossible to get to know the real will—which sometimes also happens in 
the case of adults—the surrogate should try to answer the question: “What would the 
patient choose to do if he could decide?”. If the surrogate doesn’t have sufficient knowledge 
to answer this question on the basis of the previous beliefs and choices of the patient, she is 
supposed to determine the answer by hypothetical choice. What would be the decision 
based on the hypothetical consent of the people from the example? In order to make this 
example closer to the decision making process in the case of embryo implantation, let us 
assume that Anne and John are unconscious, but the terrorists let an outsider made the 
decision on behalf of the kidnapped persons. This surrogate does not know the former views 
of the siblings and they have not made any advance directives.  
The standard procedure in this kind of situation is clear: when making decisions on 
behalf of individuals whose particular preferences are unknown, a surrogate should be 
guided by the patient’s best interests. In the classic formulation of Beauchamp and Childress 
it says that “a surrogate decision maker must determine the highest net benefit among the 
available options, assigning different weights to interests the patient has in each option and 
discounting or subtracting inherent risks or costs” ( p. 102).3 Since in the discussed case the 
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risks are identical in every option (the 0.5 probability of death), a surrogate can concentrate 
only on the expected gains available for the kidnapped—assuming that one of them 
survives. To weigh up the options a surrogate must know the probabilities of different 
options and the expected good to be maximised. In the hypothetical example, the 
probabilities are known and I assumed that the years of life would be maximised—a 
fundamentally significant good when accomplishing any plan (additionally it is easily 
expressed in numbers). But, of course, one could argue that there are some other primary 
goods (the things which every rational agent is presumed to want as they are vital for all life 
plans4) that people would want to maximise, for example, some combination of expected 
years of life with their quality, for example, ‘quality-adjusted life years’ (QALY). Nothing in 
my argumentation prevents the consideration of other primary goods along with the 
expected years of life. Obviously, if the embryos were able to decide about themselves, the 
principle of patient autonomy would require asking them for agreement. In that case—
although I have stated above that the choice based on genetic testing would be preferred by 
every rational agent—it is not certain that actually every real agent, if found in the situation 
from the hypothetical example, would choose the maximisation of the expected years of life 
or other primary goods. In reality, the agents could apply their own particular criteria of 
decision making and such a decision should have to be respected. On a similar basis, 
physicians usually respect the decisions of patients who do not wish to undergo a treatment 
or procedure which would save their lives. Although there are extensive discussions as to 
whether a patient whose choices are clearly irrational can be treated as an autonomous 
agent, these discussions do not concern my usage of this principle. If the preferences or past 
choices of the patient are unknown, a surrogate is surely not permitted to assume that the 
patient would prefer a shorter life rather than a longer one or fewer primary goods than 
more.  
The argument presented in this paper has been overlooked by contemporary 
bioethicists. A recent review article that identifies the main ethical and legal arguments in 
support of PDG names three types of ethical arguments.5 First, PGD is supposed to promote 
the well-being of future children; second, to broaden the spectrum of possibilities open to 
future children; third, to prevent future children from experiencing unfair disadvantages. 
The authors also mention other possible arguments, but finally do not treat them as genuine 
ones: that the use of PGD is related to some parental duties to promote the well-being of 
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their descendants and that PGD would reduce the burden on society.  
My argument has a few interesting advantages. One of them refers to the so-called non-
identity problem.6 A critic of arguments in favour of PGD might say that this selection 
method is neither beneficial nor harmful for those who will be born since, if the diagnosis 
was not carried out, different children could be born than those who will actually live (in 
terms of genetic material). However, this type of argumentation is not directed towards my 
point. I maintain that neither is taking the test beneficial for both siblings nor is it harmful 
that the decision is based on some random method. I only claim that such a decision should 
be made for the siblings from the examples, or the embryos in a given epistemic situation, 
when nobody knows (neither the interested parties themselves nor the agents carrying out 
the test) which agent is sick and which is healthy. I claim that this selection method should 
be chosen because it would be preferred by the interested parties themselves if they were 
guided by the maximisation of their expected life span.  
Some proponents of PGD have defended their arguments from the non-identity 
objection by claiming that PGD increases the level of well-being not for individuals but for 
the class of children brought into being and that prospective parents should “aim to have 
the child who, given her genetic endowment, can be expected to enjoy most well-being in 
her life.”7 This kind of argument refers to the view that PGD allows us to achieve various 
social or individual goals that in different contexts are treated as normal or even required, 
for example, the fulfilment of desires to have a healthy baby. The argument presented in this 
paper does not refer to any social or individual benefits and, at the same time, does not 
assume any kind of balancing of the interests of embryos with the potential social benefits 
or interests of other individuals (except for the cases discussed in the previous section where 
interests of embryos could be weighed against the interests of couples). Therefore it has a 
clear advantage: it could be accepted even by those who claim that early embryos have full 
moral status and their right to life can never be balanced with any other social or individual 
benefits.  
 
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
One could argue that the example is not sufficiently analogous to in vitro procedures 
because during IVF usually more than two embryos are created and there can be different 
chances of the development of a genetic condition than in the main case. However, these 
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factors would not change ‘the mathematics’ of my argument. Let us assume, for example, 
that four siblings have been captured by terrorists: Anne, Agnes, John and James. The 
chances that any of them have a condition similar to the one described in the main example 
is only 0.25 (the other circumstances are similar). In this situation it is also rational to 
conduct a test and decide on its basis. In cases when the choice was made randomly, the 
expected value expressed in the years of living amounts to 7.5625 
{0.25×[(40×0.75)+(1×0.25)]}. There is the 0.25 probability of being chosen, the 0.75 
probability that the chosen person is healthy (he or she will live for 40 years) and the 0.25 
probability that the chosen person is ill (he or she will only live 1 year). In cases of testing 
there is an additional complication: since the test only shows which three out of the four are 
healthy, we have to decide which of those three will survive. I assume that the procedure 
has two stages: in the first we choose two healthy siblings on the basis of the test and, in the 
second, we decide which of them will survive by some random method. Therefore the 
expected value expressed in the years of living amounts to 10 {0.75×[40×1/3]}. Other such 
modifications that would make the hypothetical examples closer to the reality of IVF 
procedures would also not change ‘the mathematics’ (eg, a different number of embryos, 
different chances of developing a condition, the implantation of more than one embryo, 
twin pregnancies, freezing of embryos and multiple rounds of PGD, taking into account other 
factors than genetic information that are relevant to a decision over which embryo to 
implant, etc).  
Of course, one could argue that it is not always possible to know the precise 
probabilities of a genetic condition or life span as in my hypothetical examples. Therefore, 
the decisions are closer to those made under uncertainty, not under risk. Does ignorance 
concerning precise probabilities or about the nature of genetic illness influence the decision 
of people from my hypothetical examples? Certainly not, because if persons in the 
hypothetical situation only had an inkling that they might have a genetic disorder that would 
shorten their life, they have a reason to take this information into account. I assume that as 
long as they are rational they cannot choose to ignore this information (in reality, many 
people at risk of genetic diseases actually prefer not to be informed about their condition). 
Therefore, for any probability, no matter how small, that one of the siblings from the main 
example would have a genetic condition and would live a shorter life than the other, it is 
rational to decide on the basis of the test. On the other hand, when the probability of the 
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genetic condition is small, the reasons to conduct genetic testing can be weak and, in the 
reality of IVF procedures, some other factors, for example, the risk related with the embryo 
biopsy procedure, can easily prevail.8 This is the reason why I claim that couples have a duty 
to use PGD only if there is a significant risk of giving birth to a child with a serious genetic 
condition (even if they do not know the precise probabilities).  
The risk related with the diagnosis generates an important complication for my 
argument. The current methods of diagnosis are not perfect: the embryo biopsy procedure 
during PGD involves a risk for embryos and the invasive prenatal diagnosis (PND) that is be 
recommended after PGD may lead to miscarriage. Some couples that desperately want to 
have a child may not want to accept these risks. They are willing to accept any child that is 
born, no matter whether it is disabled or not and they are able to give that child a relatively 
good life. There are two possible scenarios in these kinds of cases. In the first one, a couple 
does not go through IVF procedures or any type of PND, despite recommendations to do so 
and they try to conceive a child in the old-fashioned way, knowing that there is a significant 
risk that it will be born with a severe disability. The answer to the question of whether they 
are acting in a permissible way cannot be derived from my argumentation. I argued that 
couples are morally obliged to conduct PGD, only if they go through IVF, that is, when 
embryos have been already created and it is impossible to implant all of them. The second 
scenario is more relevant. In this case, a couple decides for IVF but they do not want to go 
through PGD and then PND, because they are afraid that either the embryos could die as a 
result of the diagnosis or that it would confirm a serious genetic condition. This case 
complicates my argumentation because it is a situation in which the interests of couples in 
having a child must be weighed against the interests of the embryos in maximizing their 
expected life span. The result of this weighing will depend on the value we attach to a 
couple’s desire to have a child which is genetically related to them.  
The most fundamental objection to my argument would try to investigate why a 
rational agent should maximise expected value in such situations of risk or uncertainty and 
why it is a requirement of rationality. The reason to prefer genetic tests is not that they 
increase the chances of survival, because an agent can be sure that no matter what she 
chooses (random choice or genetic testing) she will be dead in half (or, in the additional 
example at the beginning of this section, in three-quarters) of the results. The reason is that 
if an agent survives after the genetic testing, she can be sure that she is not worse off in 
9 
 
terms of longevity than if she survives after the random choice and, on average according to 
the law of large numbers, she can rationally expect to be much better off. It would be easily 
visible if we imagined a larger population of kidnapped tourists: people in the population 
where agents decide to make genetic tests will live much longer than in a population in 
which people prefer random choice. Nevertheless, the longevity of a given population does 
not have to be the reason for individuals to carry on with the genetic test. I assume that the 
victims kidnapped by terrorists only want to live a long life and they are closer to fulfilling 
this aim if they choose the genetic test. This specific feature of my hypothetical situations 
(no matter which option an agent chooses, she is dead in half or more of the results) can 
help to rid us of the problem of risk aversion. In the standard situations of risk described in 
decision theory textbooks, an agent must decide, for example, if she prefers an option in 
which there is a 0.9 probability of earning $100 (and a 0.1 probability of earning nothing) or 
an option with a 0.1 probability of earning $1000 (and a 0.9 probability of earning nothing). 
The rationality of this choice depends on the circumstances (are you a millionaire or a 
starving poor man for whom $100 is a fortune?), an agent’s risk aversion (the preference for 
more certain results even if their expected value is lower) or the other preferences of an 
agent (eg, the scale of declining marginal utility). In contrast, in the examples I have 
discussed, these factors (and some others that can influence the choice under risk or 
uncertainty) do not play any important role. In particular, the risk aversion does not have 
any role to play, because the only parameter over which people can exercise the influence of 
their decisions is their own longevity—assuming they survive the test. Since they do not 
have any influence on the mere chances of survival, the risk attitude of agents does not 
matter (the same concerns the circumstances of the choice of the declining marginal utility 
of 1 year of life). 
One could argue that discussions about the proper understating of the requirements 
of rationality might influence my argumentation. For example, one can ask whether I use an 
instrumental or substantive kind of rationality. In the hypothetical cases I have discussed, if 
we do not know the subjective wants of an agent, a surrogate should assume that an agent 
would rationally care about very specific things (ie, life expectancy). Therefore, it may seem 
that I do not limit my understanding of rationality to an account of the transmission of 
practical reasons (as a purely instrumental rationality would assume), but I also evaluate 
some of these agent preferences in terms of rationality. Thus it may seem that I use some 
10 
 
substantive notion of rationality but, however, the preference for the longest possible life 
span can be understood in terms of the purely instrumental conception of rationality. It can 
be argued that being alive is a necessary means to achieve any end. So if I claim that every 
rational agent should prefer to live rather a longer life than a shorter one, it means that it is 
a requirement of instrumental rationality (Rawls argued that the same can be said about 
other primary goods because they are the inevitable means for all life plans4). Moreover, it 
is important to keep in mind that I use the term rationality in a very limited sense: only to 
evaluate the preferences of those agents whose real ones are unknown. I do not evaluate 
the preferences of real agents in terms of rationality.  For example, the fact that it is 
required that couples maximize an embryo’s life expectancy, does not mean that a person 
who knows he will definitely develop a genetic condition should rationally consider himself 
to be better off dead. To see this point, let us consider a modified example: Anna and John 
were kidnapped by a group of terrorists, who are going to kill one of them soon… John has a 
severe illness and doctors predict that he will only live for one more year. Anna is perfectly 
healthy and one can reasonably expect that she will live for 40 years more. In such a 
situation, the argument I defend does not claim that John ought to sacrifice himself for 
Anna. Of course, some people could argue that he ought to do it because of moral reasons. 
But in this case ‘ought to’ refers not to rational requirements or those of the principle of 
patient autonomy to which I refer. Therefore, this problem is beyond the scope of my 
argumentation. 
 
PGD AND WELL-BEING 
My thesis seems to be a bit weaker than that proposed recently by Mark Walker, who used 
‘a box game’ to demonstrate that “If we are to best benefit potential supernumerary 
embryos, then we should genetically test for correlates of well-being.”9 He presented the 
following thought-experiment: 
 
Imagine you and I are sitting on identical very large boxes. One of us will win the contents of 
our box, the other will win nothing. We know that one box contains two Loonies (Canadian 
one-dollar coins) and the other contains 1,000,000 Loonies. Neither of us knows who is 
sitting on the larger amount. The game show host, whose money it is, has said that he will 
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use random selection to decide the winner, unless we both opt […] to determine the winner 
by using a metal detector to select the box with the most coins. ( p. 217) 
 
In the case of random selection, the expected pay-off is lower (250 000.50) than in 
the case of using a metal detector (500 000) (Walker mistakenly wrote 5 000 000). It is 
thus—similarly to my case—because in the first case nobody knows if the randomly chosen 
box contains $1 million or only $1. Therefore there is a 0.5 probability of choosing the box on 
which you are sitting, and a 0.5 probability that the chosen box contains a $1 million reward. 
In the second case (a metal detector), we know that the box chosen contains 1 million, and 
the probability that the box on which you are sitting will be chosen is 0.5. Therefore the 
reason to prefer metal testing is not that it increases the odds of winning, but that when one 
of us wins, we should expect to win on average more than with random selection. Walker 
also adds that the loser is killed after the contest. 
First of all it is true that, in an epistemic situation of either ‘a box game’ or the 
hypothetical examples I have discussed, the expected pay-off (either financial or expressed 
in the expected years of life) is higher when participants choose the equivalent of PGD. 
Therefore Walker is right to conclude that “metal detecting is the most rational method to 
use”. But his thesis seems to be mistaken in other respects and his example is much less 
analogous to the reality of IVF procedures than mine. These kinds of lotteries cannot “best 
benefit supernumerary embryos”, as he claims. It is so, because no matter which selection 
method we use, the same number of embryos is always implanted (or the same number of 
people survive). No matter who wins, all the benefits (either a higher pay-off or a longer life 
in my cases) go solely to the winners. Those who are not chosen using random methods or 
on the basis of the test do not benefit from the selection method as losers always have the 
same fate: death. So Walker uses the term ‘benefit’ in a very unusual sense: he suggests that 
every embryo (also supernumerary) will gain something because of PGD although only the 
winner will rake in the whole pot. He conflates the real and certain benefits of the winners 
with merely expected benefits, since he understands ‘to benefit someone’ is the equivalent 
of ‘to give someone the same chance of survival, but with the higher expected pay-off ’.  
My thesis is more reliable because of two aspects. First, I do not claim that taking a 
test in my hypothetical example (or PGD procedure) is the best benefit for both sides 
separately. I only claim that this is what would be chosen by rational agents in particular 
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situations of choice. And this is a reason why we have a moral duty to take PGD: we should 
respect the hypothetical choices of rational agents. 
Second, I do not claim that genetic tests should be taken in order to find genetic 
correlates of well-being. This obviously leads to very interesting questions in the context of 
my example. If the difference between the siblings were based on the fact that one of them, 
as an effect of some factors present in the moment of decision-making, but unknown to 
anyone, will be healthy after being released by the terrorists and the other one will be sick 
(with a similar expected life span)? Or one of them will be more intelligent and the other less 
intelligent (assuming that the higher level of intelligence correlates with well-being). Or what 
if one of them had a character that lets one enjoy life more than the other? When it comes 
to all these cases, Walker claims that if it was only possible to test these features at the 
moment of decision-making, the decision about the one who has to survive should be made 
on the basis of a particular test (the most intelligent ones survive, those with the most 
optimistic personality, etc). Thus he argues that a procedure sometimes defined as ‘positive 
eugenics’ is beneficial for supernumerary embryos.  
At this point I do not want to judge if his arguments are valid or not, but one should 
notice that the different thought experiment I have used implies that none of these stems 
from my argumentation. A rational agent has reasons to act on the basis of the expected life 
span, because this ‘parameter’ is certainly one of the primary goods which are necessary for 
every life plan. It is a similar case when it comes to health—at least in the case of very 
serious illnesses causing the permanent disability of some functions of an organism. 
However, neither the level of intelligence (except very low levels that can be treated as a 
disability) nor the predispositions of a character can be counted among those goods. Why? 
First of all, well-being is not a one dimensional property and cannot be ‘cashed’ in the same 
manner as the money reward in the box game. There are many reasons for this. One is that 
the well-being of individuals has many dimensions and depends on many different factors 
(especially their social environment) that are impossible to predict from their genetic 
endowment. Second, the way of understanding well-being itself is an important part of the 
moral doctrine or world view one accepts. So the advocates of various moral doctrines could 
understand quite different things under the label of ‘well-being’.  
It is, however, important to emphasise that my argumentation does not undermine 
the aim of PGD proposed by Walker (one should maximise the expected well-being). In this 
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paper I have only proposed a new thought experiment and method of selection that would 
be preferred by every rational agent, irrespective of their worldview or the moral doctrine 
they believe in. Walker’s criterion does not have this feature. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If PGD would be rationally preferred by the interested parties themselves, it has an 
important implication. It would mean that no matter which moral doctrine couples subscribe 
to, if they do not conduct the PGD procedure in the situation when it is impossible to 
implant all of the created embryos and when there is a significant risk of passing on a serious 
condition, they would not show proper respect for the hypothetical choices of their 
offspring. My argument demonstrates that even if somebody perceives the freezing and 
subsequent destruction of the surplus embryos remaining after an in vitro procedure to be 
the moral equivalent of killing adults, and thus sees potential parents who decide on PGD as 
just as immoral as the terrorists in the above example, she should still accept PGD as a 
method of embryo selection. 
 
 
FUNDING  
The research was supported by a grant ‘Iuventus Plus’ funded by the Polish Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education (no. IP2011065171).  
 
 
REFERENCES 
1 Żuradzki T. Niepewność na temat moralnego statusu embrionów ludzkich a 
preimplantacyjna diagnostyka genetyczna. Diametros 2012;34:179–89. 
2 Żuradzki T. Ślepy traf a preimplantacyjna diagnostyka genetyczna. Przegląd Filozoficzny. 
Nowa Seria 2013;85(1):31–46. 
3 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. The principles of biomedical ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
4 Rawls J. A theory of justice. Rev edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
5 Malek J, Daar J. The case for a parental duty to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis for 
medical Benefit. Am J Bioeth 2012;12(4):3–11. 
14 
 
6 Parfit D. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
7 Savulescu J, Kahane G. The moral obligation to create children with the best chance of the 
best life. Bioethics 2009;23(5):274–90. 
8 LaBonte ML. An analysis of US fertility centre educational materials suggests that informed 
consent for preimplantation genetic diagnosis may be inadequate. J Med Ethics 
2012;38(8):479–84. 
9 Walker M. Eugenic selection benefits embryos. Bioethics 2014;28(5):214–24. 
